

# MINI-COURSE “COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS IN MEDICINE”

## LECTURE 4

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We give illustrative examples of the mechanism “knowledge  $\mapsto$  probability” and of the corresponding information structures. After that we continue to introduce parameters of the object  $(\omega, \mathbf{E})$  of our study, moving towards operationalization. We describe a certain interaction between our experts (a prediction market) and define new parameters through it: the ultimate price of the prediction market and a specially weighted median of the experts’ probabilities.

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